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The objective of this thesis is to analyze whether the default measures obtained through the 
standard EBIT-based structural model are comparable to those obtained through credit ratings. 
This study covers all non-financial companies present on the S&P500 throughout the 2004-
2018 period. Credit risk measures coming from the two approaches were found to be broadly 
comparable. Nevertheless, it was found that on average the structural model under predicts the 
credit-ratings probability of default by 0,68 p.p. and over predicts the distance to default by 
0,57 standard deviations. This under prediction of credit risk was observed across all sectors, 
though with different degrees of intensity depending on the economic sector. The 
underprediction was found in all years of study except the financial crisis period.  
This dissertation proceeded by analysing the relation between the model and rating agencies 
default measures. The two estimates show a relatively strong correlation, notably 44% in the 
case of the probability of default and 52% in the case of the distance to default. The relation 
between the distances to default measures has been further studied through panel data 
regressions both on levels (with and without firm fixed effects) and on time differences. Under 
all approaches the coefficient for the model distance to default measure was found to be 
relatively small but significant at all the usual confidence levels. This result suggests that the 
structural model tends to overreact on all new information, while rating agencies act more 
smoothly. 
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Esta tese tem como objetivo comparar a probabilidade de insolvência obtida através de um 
modelo estrutural baseado no EBIT da empresa e o resultante das classificações das agências 
de rating. Este estudo cobre todas as instituições não financeiras, inteiramente presentes no 
S&P500 durante o período de 2004 a 2018. As duas medidas de risco de crédito são grosso 
modo comparáveis. Contudo, concluiu-se que, em média, o modelo estrutural subestima as 
probabilidades de insolvência atribuídas pelas agências em 0.68 p.p. e sobrestima a distância à 
insolvência em 0.57 desvios-padrão. Esta subestimação do risco de crédito foi observada ao 
longo de todos os setores, ainda que com diferentes graus de intensidade.  A subestimação 
ocorreu em todos os anos, com exceção do período da crise financeira. Esta dissertação 
analisou também a relação temporal entre o modelo e as medidas de insolvência provenientes 
de instituições de classificações de crédito. As duas estimativas mostram uma correlação 
relativamente forte, nomeadamente 44% para probabilidade de insolvência e de 52% para a 
distância à insolvência. A relação entre as medidas de distância à insolvência foi analisada 
através de regressões com dados em painel, em níveis (com e sem efeitos fixos da empresa) e 
em diferenças temporais. Em todas as abordagens, o coeficiente para o modelo da medida 
distência à insolvência mostrou-se relativamente pequeno, mas significativo a todos os níveis 
de confiança, sugerindo que o modelo estrutural tende a exagerar toda a informação nova, em 
contraponto com as agências de classificação de crédito que agem de forma mais gradual. 
 
Título: Consegue o modelo estrutural padrão baseado no resultado operacional replicar as 
classificações de crédito das agências de rating? Um estudo empírico nas instituições não-
financeiras do S&P500.  
Autor: Simen Bjølseth Madsen. 
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Throughout time, being able to assess whether a company is on the verge of defaulting on its 
obligations has always been of utmost importance, especially for those in the financial industry 
who hold large amounts of credit. Business reality changes however every day leading to 
changes in corporates creditworthiness. Most of the time it does so in a relatively smooth way 
as result of a sequence of mild shocks. However, these corporations are from time to time 
subject to massive shocks and drastic changes in corporate creditworthiness due to major global 
events, most recently seen due to the pandemic. As a consequence of the continuously changing 
market conditions in which these firms operate, credit risk analysis is essential to be able to 
separate the defaulters form the non-defaulters.  
 
There are multiple ways in which corporate credit risk can be analyzed. In 1942 Charles Lewis 
Merwin (1942) constructed the first accounting-based credit risk model. His model was based 
on a set of ratios that he found to be predicting default. This approach has been developed 
further and is now mostly known due to the Altman Z-score (1968). Contrary to the earlier 
univariate approaches, Altman selected five ratios that he found to be most useful for default 
prediction. These accounting-based models are usually credited to be accurate in the short term 
but often fail to be able to predict well for longer horizons.  
 
Since the before mentioned seminal works, several other approaches have been proposed. Most 
of them are mostly data-driven and lack a theoretical structure behind them. Structural credit 
risk models are a notable exception. This approach was firstly suggested by Black & Scholes 
(1973) and Merton (1974). Contrary to previous models one could finally value debt and equity 
using all observable variables and perform credit risk analysis based on a theoretical structure. 
When proposed, the so-called Merton-model (1974) became the go to model for credit risk 
analysis. Here default could be predicted as the likelihood of debt being valued less than 
nominal value. Following a number of critics to the model strict assumptions, multiple 
contributions have been made giving rise to a large body of literature known as structural credit 
risk models. As opposed to the accounting-based models, the theoretical framework behind 
structural models allowed them to use forward looking market data on stock prices contributing 
to its performance. However, these models still get outperformed by the accounting-based 




Default probability can also be analyzed through a company’s credit rating. The credit rating 
industry is dominated by three major players, notably, Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch 
Group. While these companies use different scores, the underlying purpose is the same: 
measuring credit risk. Given that rating agencies take into consideration a great deal of 
information when assessing firms and issuing their ratings, they are seen as the benchmark in 
terms of credit risk analysis. This dissertation will study whether the bankruptcy measures 
estimated by the standard EBIT-based structural model described in section 3 of Goldstein, Ju 
and Leland (2001) are comparable to those of rating agencies. The scope of study is all non-
financial companies present on the S&P500 throughout the 2004-2018 period. 
2. Literature review 
Structural models of contingent claims pricing and credit risk started from the work of Fischer 
Black & Myron Scholes (1973) and Robert Merton (1974). Following their seminal option 
pricing model, Black & Scholes (1973) suggested to view the equity of a given company as a 
European call option on the company’s assets with strike equal to nominal debt. Debt on the 
other hand could be valued as a risk-free bond less the value of a put option on the company’s 
assets. The probability of default could therefore be estimated as the probability of the put 
option ending up in the money. (Black & Scholes, 1973) (Merton, 1974) 
In 1976, shortly after the issuance of the Black-Scholes-Merton framework, Fischer Black and 
John C. Cox (1976) introduced an adaptation of the previously mentioned framework, 
answering some of the model’s harshest critics. Black and Cox assumed a first passage time 
model. This setting considered the possibility of the firm defaulting on its debt prior to maturity. 
Intuitively, this was introduced as a lower exogenous barrier on firm value, which when crossed 
equaled default. The introduction of this possibility was motivated by covenant clauses written 
on security indentures. Contrary to the Black-Scholes-Merton model, company behavior now 
mattered prior to debt maturity, which in turn increases debt value. Allowing for these new 
inclusions also made Black and Cox able to closer replicate the credit spreads observed in 
historical data. (Black & Cox, 1976) 
Close to two decades later, in 1994 Hayne E Leland (1994) developed the Black and Cox model 
(1976) further. By introducing most importantly bankruptcy cost and corporate income taxes, 
Leland developed a model to determine the optimal capital structure compatible with the trade-
off theory of optimal capital structure. Leland studied the implications of bankruptcy costs and 
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taxes for the firm optimal capital structure when considering both an endogenous- and positive 
net worth default barrier. The endogenous barrier introduced by Leland assumes that coupons 
on issued debt is in fact solely repaid by the company’s shareholders. Consequently, bankruptcy 
occurs when shareholders no longer find value in keeping the company alive. Shareholders 
decision on when to close the company depend on the model parameters. The lower the coupon 
rate and the higher the volatility, the interest rate and the tax rate, the lower the barrier is, 
implying that shareholders wait for longer to see whether the company recovers.  (Leland, 1994) 
A year later, in 1995 Francis A. Longstaff and Eduardo S. Schwartz (1995) further evolved the 
model introduced by Black and Cox (1976). Longstaff and Schwartz implemented several 
improvements to the model, among them, addressing the constant interest rate assumption made 
in the Black-Scholes-Merton framework. Contrary to the models which had previously 
introduced floating interest rates, Longstaff and Schwartz was indeed the first that were able to 
offer a closed-form solution on a first passage time setting. By introducing the possibility of 
floating interest rates Longstaff and Schwartz were able to construct a model for valuing 
corporate bonds which included both interest rate risk and default risk. This inclusion led to 
Longstaff and Schwartz being able to draw clearer connections between the probability of 
default, interest rate fluctuations and credit spreads. (Longstaff & Schwartz, 1995) 
Further developing Leland’s earlier works (Leland, 1994), Hayne E. Leland and Klaus B. Toft 
(1996) addressed the assumption of infinite life debt in their paper “Optimal Capital Structure, 
Endogenous Bankruptcy, and the Term Structure of Credit Spreads”. Contrary to the original 
assumption, Leland and Toft introduced debt rollover. As a result, in order to maintain the static 
debt structure proposed in the model, the company has to continuously replace debt that is 
maturing. Due to this dynamic, the shareholders of the company are subject to rollover risk. By 
rolling over under bad conditions replacing debt will be more costly, and incurred losses has to 
be covered by shareholders. Similar to Leland (1994), the default barrier is solely defined by 
the company’s shareholders strategic behavior.  For the same values of coupon expenses, the 
introduction of rollover risk leads however shareholders to abandon the company sooner. In 
addition, while in Leland’s model distress costs were irrelevant to determine the barrier once 
the coupon rate was set, in Leland and Toft propose that distress costs are still relevant due to 
the rollover. Leland and Toft found their model able to better mimic the historical default and 




While previous models used a diffusion process to characterize the evolution of company value, 
Chunsheng Zhou (2001) introduced the jump-diffusion process in 2001. In diffusion models, 
the asset value moves proportionally to time. So, it cannot change significantly in a short time 
span. In contrast, jump-diffusion models allow the company value to jump suddenly. This 
certain trait is something that is often due to unexpected wide market movements but can also 
be seen when companies offer completely unexpected new information to the market. Previous 
models were unable to capture this characteristic. Due to the possibility of jumping below the 
bankruptcy threshold, company value at default may vary. (Zhou, 2001)   
In 2001 Robert Goldstein, Nengjiu Ju and Hayne Leland (2001) made another major 
contribution to the literature on optimal capital structure. While Leland’s original paper sees 
the company as a combination of assets, tax benefits and distress costs (Leland, 1994), they 
consider the company as a claim on a project continuously generating earnings. Shareholders, 
debt holders, the government and distress costs are seen as claimants on this perpetual project. 
Notably, Goldstein, Ju and Leland (2001) related the project value with the company’s capacity 
to generate earnings, while in Leland’s model (1994) the asset value was taken to be completely 
exogenous to the model. Similar to Leland (1994), the barrier is set by shareholders as the result 
of an optimal stopping time problem. The main difference between the barrier proposed by 
Leland (1994) and the one used in this model, is that the firm has a continuous payout that can 
be used to pay the coupons.  While the firm is solvent, earnings are split between the 
shareholders, debt holders and the government. In the case of default, the project value after 
distress costs is divided between debt holders and the government. In the second part of the 
paper, they consider that the firm has the opportunity to issue further debt later depending on 
how the project earnings evolve. As a result of this option, it is optimal for the firm to issue 
considerably less debt in the starting stages, which is often close in line with what is observed 
in real life. This option also increased shareholder interest in the project, making them hold on 
to the company for longer without declaring bankruptcy. As a result of the lower initial debt 
and the increases in shareholder interest, the barrier value is considerably lower than in a static 
model with the same amount of coupon. (Goldstein, Ju, & Leland, 2001)  
Previously cited literature focus on either corporate finance or bond pricing questions. By 
purely focusing on improving the estimation of the probability of default, Jeff Bohn and Peter 
Crosbie (2003) introduce a pragmatic reinterpretation of the Black-Scholes-Merton framework 
in 2003. In his seminal article Merton (1974) does not discuss how to calibrate the model neither 
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its performance in default prediction. Benefiting from Moody’s extensive database, Bohn and 
Crosbie contribute on this side. In order to apply Merton-model (1974) in practice one needs to 
estimate the asset value, the asset return volatility and the default barrier. In Merton’s original 
model (1974) the default barrier is the book value of debt, as this is what the firm is obligated 
to repay. These authors consider however that the default barrier should be somewhere between 
total- and short-term debt. When estimating the default trigger Bohn and Crosbie gives a lower 
weight to the long-term debt as repayment is often far in the future. Short-term debt is weighed 
higher, as it has to be serviced within a short horizon. Once the default barrier is set, they use 
the observed market capitalization of firms to estimate the asset value and the asset return 
volatility through the utilization of an iterative algorithm. In order to further improve the 
estimated asset volatility, they combine the asset volatility from the iterative approach with the 
averages of those values obtained for firms with the same size, operate in the same industry or 
operate in the same country. Once the model is calibrated, they computed the distance to default 
(DD) for each given company. The DD measures the distance between the expected asset value 
on the maturity date and the default barrier in terms of the number of standard deviations of the 
firm asset return. They claim that this measure is a powerful determinant of a firm 
creditworthiness but that the normal distribution is unable to translate it correctly into default 
probabilities. So, as a final step they directly infer the probability of a firm defaulting within a 
year by assessing the default ratios of firms in their database having the same distance-to-
default. As this distribution is based on private information their results are not reproducible. 
However, it is known that Moody’s distribution tends to give higher probabilities than the 
Normal distribution for high DD values and lower probabilities than the Normal for low DD 
values.  The approach to probability of default estimation outlined by Crosbie and Bohn in 
combination with the Vasieck-Kealhofer model is known as Moody’s MKMV Expected 
Default Frequency (MKMV EDF). MKVM EDF is a methodology developed by Moody’s in 
order to estimate the likelihood of bankruptcy for shorter horizons. (Crosbie & Bohn, 2003) 
In 2007 Alexander S. Reisz and Claudia Perlich (2007) introduced another adaptation of first-
passage time model to the literature. Similar to Black and Cox (1976), Reisz and Perlich model 
the default barrier as an exponential function, rather than a flat barrier. Reisz and Perlich 
furthermore introduce an early default barrier in order for debt holders to extract value if some 
prespecified event would occur. Reisz and Perlich were able to outperform both the Black-
Scholes-Merton framework and the KVM approaches when estimating bankruptcies for longer 
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time horizons. However, according to the authors, for the 1-year forward estimations of 
bankruptcy the accounting-based models remain superior. (Reisz & Perlich, 2007) 
Depending on the model, the point of default varies drastically. In order to understand when 
firms actually default, Sergei A. Davydenko (2012, November) conducted a purely empirical 
study of endogenous-barrier models in 2012. Contrary to the zero net worth barrier applied by 
many models, Davydenko’s empirical findings show that asset value at the time of default often 
is significantly lower. They found values from 30% at the 5th percentile to 122% at the 95th 
percentile. The company’s average asset value is 66% at the time of default. These values are 
compatible with many insolvent firms being able to keep operating and avoid bankruptcy for 
long time. Davydenko additionally studied the relevance of the different endogenous barrier 
determinants in structural models. By analyzing empirically observed barriers of default, he 
concluded that asset-volatility and bankruptcy costs were the only determinants which 
consistently had any clear effects on the default barrier. He went on to claim that the large 
variation in default boundaries is the main driver for structural models’ difficulty in predicting 
default. He concludes that diffusion models with endogenous default barriers seem to be unable 
to replicate the empirical results, as there seems to be multiple unobservable variables that 
determine the point of default. (Davydenko, 2012, November) 
3. Model 
 
3.1 EBIT-Based Model of Dynamic Capital Structure 
My choice of model in this thesis is the EBIT-based model proposed by Goldstein, Ju & 
Leland (2001). The authors introduced two version of the model, one with the option to issue 
further debt in the future and one without this option. In this thesis the model is considered 
without this option. Even though the EBIT-based model is originally constructed to decide on 
the optimal capital structure, with minor adjustments, it is well-suited to estimate measures of 
default. 
Goldstein, Ju & Leland (2001) considers a company to hold a perpetual project, producing a 





where 𝜇𝑝 and 𝜎 both are constants. Here,  𝜇𝑝  is the drift of the project, whereas 𝜎 is the 
volatility of this projects returns. 𝑑𝑧 is a variation of the Brownian Motion or Wiener Process, 
which is a stochastic process in continuous-time. This Brownian motion has stationary 
increments, and a continuous path which means that the process is unable to jump between 
levels. Here the shocks to the log of 𝛿 are normally distributed, which is known in the 
literature as the Geometric Brownian motion (GMB). 
 
By utilizing the risk neutral approach, the authors are able to value the project by discounting 
all future cash flows at the risk-free rate. Consequently, the value of the project under the risk 
neutral approach is   
Equation 2 
 
where 𝜇 = (𝜇𝑝 − 𝜃𝜎) is the risk-neutral drift of the project and r is the risk-free rate. Both 𝜇 
and r are assumed to be constants. Here 𝜃 is defined as the market price of risk. The same 
expression can be obtained by discounting 𝛿𝑡 at the rate 𝜇𝑎, where 𝜇𝑎 = 𝑟 +  𝜃𝜎. 
The projects risk neutral drift is simply the drift of the project less the volatility adjusted market 
price of risk.  
 
Through applying Ito’s lemma to the previously defined project value function, one is able to 






Goldstein, Ju & Leland continue by defining the payout ratio of the company as 
Equation 4 
  
By substituting the payout ratio into Eq.  (2), it can be shown that the payout ratio is equal to 








By rewriting Eq.  (3), it follows that the dynamics of the project value can be described as 
Equation 7 
  
Goldstein, Ju & Leland furthermore presupposes the company to take on debt in order to obtain 
the optimal capital structure. It is considered that the company issues a perpetual bond, with a 
constant coupon C. The firm must pay this coupon independently of the project payout. As there 
is no cash buffer in the model, whenever the project payout is not enough to pay the coupon, 
the difference must be paid by the shareholder. As further explained below, it is considered that 
the firm is liquidated whenever the project level reaches a certain level. The level of liquidation 









Under the before mentioned assumptions, any claim to the project has to satisfy the following 
partial differential equation (PDE): 
Equation 8 
  
Here P is a general claim to the payout flow and will vary in accordance to what security one 
wants to price. A claim to the all 𝛿 prior to bankruptcy would result in 𝑃 =  𝛿, whereas a 
claim to all C prior to default would result in 𝑃 =  𝐶. 
 
For all claims I am interested in, 𝐹𝑡=0 because their value is time independent. In this case, the 
partial differential equation becomes a second order ordinary differential equation (ODE): 
Equation 9 
  
It is well known in that the solution to this type of equation can be found by summing the 
general solution to the homogenous equation and a particular solution1.  
 







1 The homogenous equation is same equation, with constants equal to zero. As a result, all that is not multiplied 





are constant.  A1 and A2 are constants that are determined through boundary conditions specific 
to the claim that one wishes to price. The homogenous equation 𝐹𝐺𝑆 is not considering any 
intertemporal cash flows. 
 
The particular solution depends on the specific claim one wants to price.  
 
The authors proceed by introducing PB(V). They define this as a claim that pays $1 contingent 
on the company value reaching the default barrier. As PB(V) is in line with  𝐹𝐺𝑆 (i.e. it is not 




They proceed by considering these boundary conditions 
Equation 14 
 
As company value goes towards infinity, the claim that pays $1 contingent on the company 
value reaching the default barrier becomes zero. If the company value on the other hand goes 
towards the default barrier, the value of this claim becomes one.  
 
 





The second claim that the authors consider is the claim to all the intertemporal cashflows of the 
project. As long as the firm does not default, shareholders, the government and debtholders will 
divide the payout of the project among them. These claimants are receiving the payout flow 
through dividends, taxes and coupon payments.  
 
The combined value of these claims to the payout flow of the company is defined as Vsolv. 
Here P will be replaced by (𝑘 ∗ 𝑉) in the ODE (Eq. 9). A particular solution to this ODE is 
thus 𝑉. Vsolv is thus given by  
Equation 16 
 
Again, A1 and A2 can be found by imposing boundary conditions. In the case that V goes to 
infinity, Vsolv  goes towards  V, On the contrary in the case that V is equal to VB, Vsolv  becomes 
zero. This allow us to determine A1 and  A2.  
 
Consequently Vsolv can be written as 
Equation 17 
 














Here 𝜏𝑒𝑓𝑓  is the effective tax rate and 𝜏𝑖 is the tax on interest.  
 
In order to find the optimal default barrier VB, the authors use the smooth-pasting condition 
Equation 22 
 







and C* is the optimal amount of debt, which is found in the paper by maximizing the sum of 
equity and debt value.  
 
Goldstein, Ju & Leland did not provide any formula to compute the default probability. The 
first passage time probability of a GBM is nevertheless standard in the literature. Following for 




As the formula in Eq.  (25) computes the probability of survival, probability of default is 




The second measure of default estimated in the model is the distance to default. Which was 
computed in the following manner  
Equation 26 
 
4. Calibration strategy  
Prior to estimating the default measures, I calibrated the asset value, asset volatility (𝜎𝑎), payout 
ratio (𝑘) and the market price of risk (𝜃). Asset value, 𝜎𝑎 and 𝑘 are set through the iterative 
scheme presented in Section 4.1 and further detailed in Section 5.3. 𝜃 is set as explained in 
Section 4.2 and further detailed in Section 5.4. The remaining parameters are calibrated through 
accounting or market data. The EBIT and equity are set as explained in Section 5.2. The 𝛽, 
EQRP and 𝜎𝑒 are set as explained in Section 5.4.  
 
4.1 Iterative approach 
In order to calibrate the Goldstein, Ju & Leland model (2001), I have utilized the iterative 
approach proposed by Vassalou & Xing (2004). This approach is frequently referred in 
Moody’s KMV technical documentations2. This iterative approach was originally suggested to 
calibrate the Merton-model (1974), since one only has to give values to asset and sigma.  
 
In words, their approach works as follows. 
 
1. Compute the volatility of equity based on daily observation for the last year and use 
this value as a starting point for 𝜎𝑎.  
2. For each day of trading, estimate the value of assets through the equity valuation 
formula from Black & Scholes (1973) by using the real and observed value of equity 
and the “estimated” 𝜎𝑎.  
3. Recompute 𝜎𝑎 as the standard deviation of the newly estimated daily asset values.  
4. Repeat this process until 𝜎𝑎 coming from two repeated iterations converge.  
 
 
2 (Crosbie & Bohn, 2003) 
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Vassalou & Xing set their tolerance level of convergence to be 0,0001. Following the estimation 
of 𝜎𝑎, they could proceed to obtain the value of assets. 
 
Following the same procedure as my fellow student Lukas Weisel (2020), I extended this 
approach also to calibrate 𝑘. 
 
1. Based on the iterative approach of Vassalou & Xing (2004), the tolerance level of 
convergence was set to 0,0001. 
2. The initial estimate for 𝑘 to be used in the iterative approach was set to 5 %. 
3. Proceed to use the iterative approach of Vassalou & Xing on the model of Goldstein, 
Ju & Leland (2001) to estimate the project value and 𝜎𝑎 .  
4. Estimate the value of 𝑘. Here 𝑘 is equal to the average of EBIT divided by the asset 
values obtained through the iterative approach.  
5. Repeat this process until the value of 𝑘 obtained from two consecutive iterations is 
below the tolerance level of convergence of 0,0001.  
 
Following the estimations of both 𝑘 and 𝜎𝑎, a time series for the value of assets can be 
attained. In this dissertation both 𝑘 and 𝜎𝑎 are assumed to be constant for the whole time 
series.  
 
4.2 Market price of risk - θ 
In order to compute the actual probability of default, one must use measure P as opposed to 
Q. In order to do this, the market price of risk has to be obtained. While there are many 
approaches that can be followed in order to construct the market price of risk, for simplicity I 
have chosen to utilize the capital asset pricing model.  
The capital asset pricing model is frequently used to find the required rate of return one 
should demand when investing in risky assets, mostly used for stocks.  
The capital asset model states that the required rate of return by an investor investing in 





Here 𝑟𝑖 is the required rate of return, 𝑟𝑓 is the risk-free interest rate, 𝛽𝑖 is the beta of the stock 
and 𝑟𝑚 is the return of the market portfolio.  (𝑟𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓) is therefore the excess return above the 
risk-free rate or the equity risk premium (EQRP) obtained by an investor, when investing in the 
market portfolio. 𝛽𝑖 is defined as a measure of the systematic risk of a company. 𝛽𝑖 ∗ (𝑟𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓) 
therefore, expresses the required return above the risk-free rate expected by an investor, based 
on the systematic risk of a stock relative to the market portfolio.  
 
Goldstein, Ju & Leland (2001) do not give an expression to compute the expected return on 
stocks/equity. However, it is well known that the expected return on stocks/equity under this 
model can be written as  
Equation 28 
 
Here 𝜇𝑒 is the expected return on stocks/equity, 𝜃 is the market price of risk and 𝜎𝑒 is the 
volatility of that particular stock/equity. This expression follows from the application of Ito’s 
lemma to the equity valuation formula. One should note however that under this model, 𝜎𝑒 is 
not a constant but rather a function of the project value and project returns volatility σ. When 
comparing to Eq. (27) it is clear that (𝑟𝑖 −  𝑟𝑓) from Eq. (27) and  (𝜇𝑒 −  𝑟𝑓) from Eq. (28) 
expression is the same thing i.e. the expected return from the stock/equity above the risk-free 
rate. Consequently 𝛽𝑖 ∗ (𝑟𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓) or 𝛽𝑖 ∗ (𝐸𝑄𝑅𝑃) from Eq. (27) and (𝜃 ∗ 𝜎𝑒) from Eq. (28) 
has to be the same.  




The market price of risk is the usually referred to as the Sharpe ratio. Which is constructed as 
the risk adjusted equity risk premium (stocks return above risk free rate), divided by the 
particular stocks/equity volatility. The estimation of 𝛽, 𝜎𝑒 and 𝐸𝑄𝑅𝑃 is found in Section 





5.1 Company selection 
Prior to doing any estimations or treatments of data I first had to construct the portfolio of 
companies. Through accessing Compustat - Capital IQ in the Wharton Research Data Service 
(WRDS) database I was able to obtain the list of index constituents on the S&P500 for the 
2004-2018 period. This selection of companies was narrowed down by excluding 251 
companies that are not present on the S&P500 throughout the entire period covered by this 
dissertation, which spans from 2004 to 2018. As I wanted to assess how default measures varied 
across time, while assuring that the companies were of comparable size, I wanted to keep the 
same sample of companies across the entire timespan.  
Furthermore, I excluded 44 financials companies (i.e. those belonging to the S&P Economic 
Sector Code – 800). The initial round of company selection resulted in a sample of 206 
companies across 10 sectors3.  
 
The second and final round of data cleaning was performed post acquiring the accounting data 
for the initial sample. Since the model assumes a Geometric Brownian motion, negative EBIT 
violates the model assumptions. Nevertheless, the estimation method used is able to overcome 
this as long as the average EBIT is positive. This resulted with 5 companies with an average 
negative EBIT being removed. Furthermore, 42 firms with zero interest expense for one or 
multiple periods were excluded. As the model relies on interest cost to estimate the default 
barrier and thus all measures of default, this firms would simply never default.  
After the two rounds of data cleaning, the final sample consisted of 159 companies across 9 
sectors as outlined in Table 1.  
Table 1 - Company overview 
 
 
The detailed description of all firms is found in Appendix 1-2.  
 
 
3 The S&P 500 is mostly composed of very large companies. This exclusion of companies entering post 2004 
might have exacerbated the selection bias.  
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5.2 Parameters calibrated through accounting and market data 
 
5.2.1 EBIT and interest cost 
The company specific EBIT and interest cost were retrieved from DataStream. Due to both 
EBIT and interest costs being accounting data, these variables were downloaded as yearly 
values. In order to adapt these variables to fit the weekly increments of the model, I used 
interpolation. The interpolation process consisted of two steps. The initial step was to construct 
start of the year values for each year as the yearly EBIT or interest costs divided by 52. Finally, 
I computed all weekly values in between by constructing a straight line between the start of the 
year values, known as linear interpolation.  
 
5.2.2 Interest rate 
The interest rate for the 2004-2018 period was approximated using the time series of the 30-
Year US Treasury Bill. This long-term interest rate is used since it reduces the number of cases 
where a negative value for the risk-free rate could occur. The time series was downloaded in 
weekly increments from DataStream. The interest rate used in the model is the after-tax interest 
rate, found through applying the tax rate on interest. While the tax rate on interest has varied 
slightly from 2004-2018, it is desirable to have a constant rate across time. Based on the values 
observed in the period of study, I have assumed it to be constant at 35%. The interest rate before 

















Figure 1 - Interest rate  
 
Here a major drop in the interest rate is observed in the end of 2008 during the financial crisis. 
Other significant drops are seen at the end of 2011 during the EU sovereign debt crisis and 
during the oil crisis in 2014-2016.  
 
5.2.3 The effective tax rate on corporate profits 
In addition to the tax rate on interest, the model uses the effective tax rate. In order to compute 
this, I had to know both the tax rate on dividends and the corporate tax rate. Both the corporate- 
and dividend tax rate has varied across the timespan of the analysis. However, I wanted to keep 
both of these variables’ constant throughout the calculations. Considering the different values 
for both variables and timespan these values were present, it was chosen to use the same tax 
rate of 20% for both the corporate- and the dividend tax rate.  
The effective tax rate was therefore computed in the following manner as 
 
(1 − 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑎𝑥) = (1 − 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑥) ∗ (1 − 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑡𝑎𝑥) 
 




5.2.4 Market value of equity  
Equity is not a parameter, but an input that is used to find the market value of the project.  
Company specific equity was as with previously mentioned variables retrieved from 
DataStream. As market value of equity is a flow measure, the values were downloaded in 
weekly increments. The market value of equity is the product of the number of shares 
outstanding and the price per share. As the number of shares rarely change, variations are 
caused by the change in the share price. In order to compare the evolution of the market cap of 
the portfolio with the S&P500, I downloaded the weekly time series of the S&P500 from 
DataStream. 
The combined market value of all firms can be seen in Figure 2  




As seen from both the plot and the correlation between the series, the portefolio of 159 
companies follow the dynamics S&P500 closely. These results are a little suprising, considering 
the S&P500 continuously has firms exiting and entering the index and that the entire financial 
sector is excluded. As observe in the Figure 2 above, market capitalization is drastically reduced 
during the financial crisis of 2008-2009. Furthermore one can also see the significant drops in 
market capitalication caused by the sovereign debt cirisis within the EU in 2011 and the end of 
the oil crisis in 2014-2016. 
*Values in millions Correlation: 0,989 
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5.3 Parameters calibrated through the iterative algorithm 
 
5.3.1 Asset volatility - 𝝈𝒂 
Asset volatility is one of two variables obtained from the iterative approach outlined in 
Section 4.1. The asset volatility used for estimations in the model, is extracted when two 
repeated iterations converge. When extracted, 𝜎𝑎 is equal to the product of the standard 
deviation of the log changes in asset values and the square root of 52.  
The average asset volatility across the different sectors is found in Table 2. It is clear that 
average asset volatility for the utilities and the consumer staples sector are considerably lower 
than the other sectors (Table 2). In contrast, the health care and technology sector show the 
highest average asset volatility. 
Table 2 - Average asset volatility 
 
 
When comparing the asset volatilities with the empirical equity volatilities (Table 5), there is 
a much lower level clearly observed for all firms.  
I furthermore assessed if there is any connection linking the individual company’s asset- and 
equity volatility (Section 5.4.2) by running a regression between the two series as seen in 




Figure 3 - Asset volatility vs equity volatility 
 
 
Even though the coefficient of determination is low, it indicates that some of the variation in 
the equity volatility series can be explained by the variation in the asset volatility series. This 
relation is weaker than expected, which shows that more business risk does not necessarily 
mean more equity risk, as firms with lower business risk may be more levered.  
 
5.3.2 Payout ratio – 𝒌 
The company payout ratio similarly to asset volatility is found through the iterative approach 
(Section 4.1). The payout ratio at the sector level is found in Table 3. 
Table 3 - Payout ratio 
 
 
Considering Table 3 it is apparent that the utilities sector has a much higher payout than the 
other sectors. Since the utilities sectors on average is very stable and mature, the high payout 
ratio was not surprising. On the other side of the spectrum a similar payout ratio is seen across 
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the remaining eight sectors, with technology and health care being slightly lower. Due to the 
necessity of continuous research into new technologies and new pharmaceutical products, as 
well as the emphasis on growth for the technological companies these payout ratios are 
representable.  
 
5.3.3 Project value – 𝑉 
The project value is found through the iterative approach (Section 4.1) following the 
estimations of 𝜎𝑎 and 𝑘. The project value is the one implicit in the market cap (i.e. equity 
value) conditional on the model (Section 3) and the calibrated value of all its parameters. The 
combined project value of all firms can be seen in Figure 4. It is clear that the project- and 
equity value follow each other, as indicated by the lines in Figure 4. However, one can 
observe that the variations in the equity value are amplified when compared to the project 
value. This is due to equity being a leveraged claim.  







*Values in millions Correlation: 92,16% 
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5.4 From measure Q to measure P 
 
5.4.1 Beta – 𝛽 
The company specific beta-coefficients were also acquired through DataStream. As for the 
market value of equity, beta was downloaded in weekly increments. In order to avoiding that 
changes in the PD computations was a result of changes in beta value, the company specific 
beta used for estimation was the average of all company beta values.  
 
The average beta for each industry can be seen in Table 4 below.  
Table 4 - Beta 
 
 
There are significant differences between the average beta of each industry (Table 4). Due to 
utilities being a necessity, its demand stays relatively stable regardless of market condition. 
Hence, the low beta value is expected. The same characteristics can be seen for both consumer 
staples and health care. On the contrary it is apparent that the technology sector is considered 
riskier than the other sectors. This result was also expected due to the extreme volatility that 
usually describes technological companies. 
 
5.4.2 Empirical equity volatility - 𝝈𝒆   
Empirical equity volatility is mainly used in the calibration of the market price of risk. 
The equity volatility was computed in the following manner. Initially I estimated the non-
annualized empirical equity volatility as the standard deviation of the log changes in equity. As 
a second step I recomputed a new series with the log changes in equity. In the third step I 
constructed upper and lower limits for the series of log changes in equity as plus/minus three 
standard deviations. Furthermore, I removed all values outside these boundaries. Finally, I 
computed the volatility of equity as the product of the standard deviation of this time series and 
the square root of 52. This process follows the approach done by my fellow student Lukas 
(2020). As 𝜎𝑒  is used in the calibration of the model, this will help make results comparable.  
The average equity volatility in the different sectors is seen in Table 5. 
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Table 5 - Average empirical equity volatility 
 
 
It is apparent that the utilities and consumer staples sector has the lowest average equity 
volatility (Table 5). As previously mention in Section 5.4.1, these sectors tend to be very stable, 
therefore these results are not surprising.  
 
Additionally, I computed the model implied equity volatility through the application of Ito’s 
lemma. The regression between the empirical equity volatility and the model implied equity 
volatility resulted in a R-Squared of 0,99, which suggest that the model is well calibrated. The 
section on model implied equity volatility and the regression can be found in Appendix 9. 
 
5.4.3 Equity risk premium (EQRP) 
The equity risk premium for the 2003-2018 period was downloaded from the web page of 
professor Aswath Damodaran. Professor Damodaran is an often-cited source when it comes to 
valuation and is therefore also used in this thesis. In his website, Professor Damodaran present 
several estimates of the equity risk premium for the U.S. market. In this dissertation, two 
estimates are used. The first measure Implied Premium (FCFE) refers to implied premium 
based on the free cash flow to equity, which is seen as dividends to stockholders. The second 
measure Implied Premium (FCFE with sustainable Payout) on the other hand assumes that free 
cash flow to equity will decrease over time to a more sustainable level. By combining the 
Implied Premium (FCFE) (Appendix 8) and Implied Premium (FCFE with sustainable Payout) 
(Appendix 8), I obtained a new yearly series of EQRP values (Appendix 8). Due to the yearly 
nature of the EQRP many of the detailed changes within the year is non observable. In order to 
solve the previously mentioned problem, I proceeded by doing the following. I downloaded a 
weekly time series of the S&P500 from DataStream for the period 2003-2018. Constructed 
weekly ratios by dividing each weekly observation by the average value of the S&P500 that 
year. Created weekly EQRP values by dividing the combined EQRP for that year with the 
weekly ratios. Finally, the weekly EQRP for the 2004-2018 period was computed as the 4-week 
moving average of the constructed timeseries.  
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The constructed EQRP timeseries and the combined yearly EQRP from Damodaran can be seen 
in Figure 5 below. 
Figure 5 - Equity risk premium 
 
When referring to the Figure above it is obvious the combined EQRP from Damodaran has 
changes only at year end, whereas the constructed EQRP has a lot more detail. From the MA-
4* it is apparent that EQRP peaks at the end of 2008 during the financial crisis, before it drops 
drastically in the first months of 2009.  
 
5.4.4 Market price of risk – 𝜽 
As previously outlined in Section 4.2, 𝜃 is found as the product of 𝛽 and EQRP divided by the 
empirical equity volatility. Since 𝛽 and 𝜎𝑒  are set constant across time, all variation in 𝜃 is 
caused by changes in the EQRP. 
















Due to the constant 𝛽 and 𝜎𝑒 the dynamics of the time series is equal to those of the EQRP 




The average 𝜃 in the different sectors is found in Table 6. 
Table 6 - Average θ 
 
 
As can be observed in both Figure 6 and Table 6 there is quite big differences between the 
different sectors. Since the EQRP is the same for all sectors, the variation is driven by the 
differences in 𝛽 and 𝜎𝑒. Since the average 𝜎𝑒 across sectors is within relatively close 
proximity of each other, the differences in 𝜃 are caused by the large span of the beta-
coefficient.  
 
5.5 Robustness check 
 
5.5.1 State variable – 𝜹 
In the EBIT-based model (2001), Goldstein, Ju & Leland assume that the dynamics of the model 
state variable (EBIT) follow a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM). Consequently, the state 
variable has a Log-normal distribution. In order to assess whether the EBIT for each individual 
company has a Log-normal distribution, I have tested the log changes of EBIT using the 
Shapiro-Wilk test.  
The Shapiro-Wilk test tests the null hypothesis that the log changes in EBIT are normally 
distributed. Following most scientific papers, I have assumed an alpha of 0,05. This means that 
if a series of log changes in EBIT obtains a p-value of less than 0,05 one rejects the null 
hypothesis of normal distribution. If the p-value is above 0,05 one cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of normal distribution.  
 
P-values from the Shapiro-Wilks test for all firms can be found in Appendix 3-5. The number 




Table 7 - State variable 
 
 
The Shapiro-Wilk test is rejected for 62 out of 159 firms (Table 7), which is approximately 
39%. Consumer staples is the sector with the largest rejection rate, whereas transportation 
surprisingly has no rejections. Additionally, a 40% rejection rate can be observed for the 
consumer cyclicals sector. The name of the sector itself suggest that the GMB may not fit well. 
The GBM states that the past is irrelevant for prediction, only the present matters. In contrast, 
a cyclical sector means that it from time to time returns to something. As a result, it is normal 
that the GBM tends to be more rejected in this type of sector.  
6. Results 
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part presents the 5-year distance to default (i.e. 
the expected distance in 5 years between the market value of the business and the default barrier 
normalized by business risk) and the probability of default that is produced by the model (i.e. 
the likelihood of the asset process hitting the default barrier at least once in the next 5 years). 
In the second part, these results are compared with the ones implied by credit ratings.   
 
6.1 Model estimated default measures  
 
6.1.1 Distance to default (DD) 
The distance to default is a widely used credit risk metric since Merton (1974) first proposed 
its ground-breaking model. Summarized, this metric measures the expected distance in T years 
between the market value of the assets (or business) and the default barrier normalized by 
business risk. It thus synthetizes in a single measure three key corporate characteristics: market 
leverage, expected dynamics and risk. In this thesis as for PD I have considered a 5-year horizon 
for the DD estimations. The average value per sector can be seen in Table 8. The average 
aggregate DD is computed directly on firms and has a mean value 2,92 (Table 8). With the 
exception of the utilities sector, and at a lesser extent, the basic materials sector, all sectors have 
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an average DD close to 3. The lowest DD found on a sector level is 1,37 for the utilities sector 
in May 2009, whereas the health care sector has the highest DD of 4,54 in December 2004.  
Table 8 - Average DD 
 
 
The time-series of the average DD by sector is presented in Figure 7 (panel A and B). The 
aggregate average DD ranges from 1,93 in May 2009 to 3,27 in May 20064. One can observe 
that all sectors show a high level of co-movement (Figure 7). For instance, it is noticeable that 
all sectors have a significant drop in DD during the financial crisis. While there is quite a large 
spread between the sectors prior to this event, post 2009 this gap becomes a lot tighter. This 
global pattern is mixed with some sector specific events. As an example, during the oil crisis 
the energy-, technology- and transportation sectors show a larger decline, while the other 

















4 Individual sector ranges: Transportation(1,76:3,78), Utilities(1,37:2,74), Health care(2,35:4,54), Capital 
good(1,84:3,95), Energy(1,96:3,66), Technology(2,22:4,27), Basic materials(1,52:3,14), Consumer 
cyclicals(1,85:3,45), Consumer staples(2,14:3,37) 
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The dynamic of the DD can be better understood by looking at business risk (i.e. 𝜎𝑎), the drift 
term (𝜇𝑝) and the ratio of the market value of assets to the barrier. The first measure was already 
discussed in Section (5.3.1). If a company’s business risk increases all else equal, the distance 
to default decreases. In Section 5.3.1 we have seen that the consumer staples and utilities sector 
had a level of business risk below all other sectors. In contrast, the technology sector showed a 
level of business risk above all others. The measure P drift and the ratio between the market 
value of assets and the default barrier are presented in Table 9 and 10, respectively. 
 
The project drift is the return on assets (Appendix 10) less the companies payout ratio (Section 
5.3.2). This is also referred to as the company’s expected growth rate. Looking at Table 9, it 
can be noted that there is big difference between the sectors. For the utilities sector the growth 
rate is actually negative, whereas the technology sector has a growth rate well above the 
remining sectors. The remaining sectors can be divided in two groups. Here the transportation, 
basic materials and consumer staples sector range between a lower range of 0,41% to 0,60%. 
Whereas the health care, capital goods. energy and consumer cyclicals sector ranges between 
0,97% to 1,46%. Furthermore, it should be noted that the technology sector is the only sector 
with a drift above mean inflation level over the past years  
Table 9 - Project drift 
 
 
The default barrier to asset ratio measures how far the asset value is from the barrier without 
scaling by the project volatility. It can be thus seen as a market-based leverage measure. Due 
to the fact that a company defaults if the value of assets is equal to or less than the barrier, the 
ratio must lie between zero and one. If the barrier to asset ratio of a company increases, so does 
the probability of default, while the DD decreases. The barrier to asset ratio for all sectors is 
presented in Table 10. On average most sectors have a barrier to asset ratio close to each other. 
The utilities sector has a significantly higher barrier to asset ratio signalling a high degree of 
financial leverage.  
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Table 10 - Barrier/Assets 
 
 
The three indicators just presented help us understand the DD results. In particular, regarding 
the utilities sector, it can be concluded that though it has lower business risk than the other 
sectors, it also shows a higher degree of leverage and the lowest drift. As a result, it has the 
lowest DD over time. The technology sector shows the opposite characteristics. With the 
highest business risk, the highest drift and the lowest leverage it has the highest DD across time.  
 
6.1.2 Probability of default (PD) 
The most used credit risk measure is the probability of default (PD). This is presented in Figure 
8 (panel A and B). In this dissertation as for the DD, the horizon considered is 5 years. The 



























The average probability of default of the entire portfolio is 0,63%, ranging between 0,30% in 
December 2006 and 2,95% in March 2009. This relatively tight range hides however 
considerable variation at the sector (Table 12) and especially at the firm level (Table 11). As 
expected, and in line with the DD, the utilities and basic materials sectors are the ones with the 
highest PD. In contrast, the transportation sector shows the lowest PD. 
Table 11 – PD, sector ranges at individual firm level 
 
Table 12 - Average PD 
 
 
On the time dimension, it is apparent that all sectors spent the period from 2004 until the start 
of 2008 recovering from the financial turmoil associated with the dotcom bubble (Figure 8). 
Throughout this period the PD for the utilities sectors stands out from the remaining sectors. 
This sector shows a non-negligible PD whereas most other sectors show close to no probability 
of default. During the financial crisis of 2008-2009 there are significant observable difference 
in how the different sectors PD evolve. The basic materials, consumer cyclicals and utilities 
sectors have a much larger increase in the PD, than the remaining sectors. The utilities and basic 
materials sectors have PDs of 4,5% and 5% at the peak of the crisis, respectively. For all sectors, 
PDs decrease towards post crisis levels within 2011. For the 2015-2016 oil crisis there are clear 
differences between how individual sector PDs react. As expected, the PD for the energy sector 
peaks at 3,2%, significantly higher than for the others. With the exception of the basic materials, 
at a lesser extent the technology sector, whose PDs also increased during this period, the PD 
for all other sectors remained more or less stable. Lastly, the energy sector has a clear peak at 




6.2 Credit rating 
A credit rating is a letter issued by a credit rating agency, which represents the probability of 
the debt not being repaid. The world leaders in credit rating are Moody’s, S&P and Fitch Group. 
These credit rating agencies take into account enormous amounts of both firm and 
macroeconomic information when issuing credit ratings. Consequently, their credit ratings are 
seen as the benchmark5 when evaluating the probability of default of a given firm. The model 
here proposed is much easier to implement and is based solely on widely available information. 
An obvious question is thus how far credit ratings are from the credit risk measures. In this 
Section, and in order to further assess the default measures estimated by the model, I compare 
them to the credit rating-based measures. In section 6.2.1 this is done by looking at average 
values and through scatter plots. In section 6.2.2 the analysis is extended by running some panel 
data regressions. 
 
6.2.1 A comparison between credit rating implied measures and model measures 
In order to compare the measures, I started by gathering the credit ratings from both Moody’s 
and Standard and Poor’s for all companies. I proceeded by transforming the credit ratings from 
Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s into one single measure. This was done by transforming the 
individual measures into numerical values using a numerical scheme6, averaging them and 
finally restating the obtained value in the usual S&P scale (Appendix 7). The average credit 
rating per sector, per year is found in Table 13. It is clear that most of my sample is made of 
investment grade corporates (Table 13). Taking all corporate-date pairs, one can conclude that 
92% of all individual ratings are investment grade.  
 
 
5 The fact that they are seen as the benchmark, does not mean that they are right. 
6 1 to AAA, 2 to AA+, 3 to AA, 4 to AA-, 5 to A+, 6 to A, 7 to A-, 8 to BBB+, 9 to BBB, 10 to BBB-, 11 to 
BB+, 12 to BB, 13 to BB-, 14 to B+, 15 to B, 16 to B-, 17 to CCC+ and 18 to CCC. 
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Table 13 - Average credit ratings by year and sector of activity 
 
 
Lastly, I utilized the transition matrix issued by Standard and Poor’s (Appendix 6) in order to 
transform the credit ratings into probabilities of default. This resulted in yearly probabilities of 
default for all companies. The average probability of default per sector can be seen in Table 14. 
This table shows that model PDs underestimate the credit rating PDs by 0,68 p.p. on average. 
This underestimation is computed as the p.p. difference between measures. Though this 
difference is large in relative terms (credit rating implied PDs are 0,68 p.p. higher), it can be 
deemed small in absolute terms. This type of difference is observed in most sectors, except the 
utilities sector, where the PDs are noticeably close. On the contrary one can see a very large 
spread between the estimates for the technology sector. Here, the probability of default implied 




Table 14 - PD comparison7 
 
 
The average PD for all companies across the period 2004-2018 can be seen in Figure 9. The 
PDs obtained from credit ratings are very stable, with a peak in 2009 (Figure 9). This was 
already in part expected as all companies assessed in this thesis have stayed listed on the 
S&P500 throughout the entire period and are mostly investment grade credit ratings. Notice 
that for these ratings PDs tend to be very small. Apart from the PD coming from the model in 
2009, model PDs are consistently lower than the ones implied by credit ratings. 
Figure 9 - PD, rating vs. model 
  
 
The probability of default is known to be very non-linearly related with fundamentals, which 
turns hard any econometric analysis built on traditional linear models. Given these non-linear 
relations, it is common to carry most of the analysis on an alternative setting and then restore it 
back. This is what occurs in a Logit or Probit credit risk regression-based models. In the latter 
case, this is done by using the Normal distribution. Interestingly, something similar occurs in 
Merton’s model. In this case, the distance to default (i.e. the risk adjusted distance between the 
market values of assets and the default barriers) is computed and then translated into a PD by 
 
7 Difference = Average credit rating PD – Average model PD 
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using the Normal distribution function. In the case of Merton’s model, the distance to default 
is thus just the inverse normal of the PD. In the model here presented, due the possibility of 
hitting the barrier before the considered maturity, the inverse normal is not equal to the risk 
adjusted distance between the market values of assets and the default barriers, as previously 
defined. Nevertheless, it can still be seen as a more tractable credit risk indicator. Figure 10 
(panel A and B) shows two scatter plots of the PD and the DD, respectively. The DDs were 
computed from the PDs at the individual company level by using NORM.INV in Microsoft 
Excel. From these figures, it can be seen that while in the case of the PD, a correlation of 44% 
was found, in the case of the DD, this figure increases to 52%. 
 








The aggregated DD for all sectors across the 2004-2018 period can be seen in Figure 11. 
Furthermore, the average DD per sector can be seen in Table 15. On average DD coming from 
the model is 0,57 standard deviations higher than the credit rating implied (Table 15). This is 
estimated as the difference in DD between the two measures. It is evident from Figure 11 that 
the DD implied by credit rating remains very stable over time. Even though there is a minor 
decline in the DD in 2009, it remains within 2,3-2,4 for the entire timeseries. The DD from the 
model has much larger variations. Under normal circumstances the DD coming from the model 
remains higher than the ones implied by credit ratings, whereas in 2009 during the financial 
crisis it is lower. 
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Figure 11 -DD, ratings vs. model 
  
Table 15 - DD averages8 
 
 
Throughout this section we have seen that the model is underestimating credit risk, but why? 
In the standard EBIT-based structural model company dynamics are assumed to follow a 
Geometric Brownian motion, which leads to a continuous path meaning that the process is 
unable to jump between levels in a short period of time. Related to this, the project return 
distribution does not have much probability in the tails. In my model, as in the original Merton-
model, except for the consideration of the first passage time, the PD is basically the negative of 
the DD evaluated under the Normal Distribution. The drawback of this approach has been 
illustrated by Hamilton, Munves & Sun (2012) from Moody’s Analytics. Since the Normal 
distribution does not have much probability in the tails, for higher values of DD, we end up 
with an underestimation of credit risk. Moody’s compensates this by using their empirical 
mapping, which related observed default rates with their model distances do default. In the case 
of very low DDs, the use of the Normal distribution leads to an overestimation of credit risk.  
 
 
8 Difference = Average credit rating DD – Average model DD 
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In addition to the assumption of GBM, the EBIT-based model does not consider debt rollover. 
As a consequence of not rolling over debt, the companies are not subject to the potential 
liquidity risk. This can cause the probability of default to be underestimated.  
  
6.2.2 An econometric analysis of the results 
Section 6.1 has shown that the structural model proposed in this dissertation tends to 
underestimate credit risk as compared to credit rating agencies.  Is this difference constant 
across all firms and sectors? Is this a problem just on the mean level? In this section these 
questions are addressed by carrying some panel regressions using the function “plm” in R.  
These regressions can be divided into two groups. First, the relation between the credit ratings 
implied DD and the model DD is studied. Then, the focus turns to the time variation in the DDs.  
 
To start, I run a pooling model with and without intercept term. Here the credit rating implied 
DD is the dependent variable and model DD is the independent variable. The results from these 
regressions are found in Table 16. One can see that in the case with intercept I obtain a large 
intercept of 1,87 and a 𝛽 of only 0,17 (Table 16). These are basically the same values presented 
in Figure 10 (Panel B). Both of these coefficients are significant at all significance levels. 
Additionally, an R-Squared of 0,26 is attained. I proceed by analysing the same regression while 
removing the intercept. Here we can notice a significant change in 𝛽, which is now 0,75. The 
mean error level is now positive at 0.177. While the value has changed, it is still significant at 
all significance levels. In addition, it is worth mentioning that, though the intercept was 
significant, taking it out does not change the R-Squared. Both R-Squared obtained from the 
regressions on levels tell me that the model DD is able to explain 26,05% of the variation in 
credit rating implied DD.  





Next, a panel regression with firm fixed effects was run. The results of this fixed effect 
regression are found in Table 17. Here I obtain a 𝛽 of only 0,07, significant at all significance 
levels. Additionally, an R-Squared of 12% is obtained. This value is nevertheless the add-on 
due to the covariate. When the firm fixed effects are taken into account, the R-Square increases 
to 83%. Most of the variation is thus explained by the firm fixed effects rather than the structural 
model distance to default. 
Table 17 - Panels regression, levels and fixed effects 
 
 
I proceeded by extracting the firm fixed effects using the function “fixef”. The average, 
maximum and minimum fixed effect per sector can be seen in Table 18. Here it is noticeable 
that the average fixed effect is similar across sector. Sectors average fixed effect range from 2 
in the technology sector to 2,25 in the health care sector. Interestingly, the average fixed effect 
is higher than the intercept computed in the pooling model (Table 16). Within each sector, the 
technology sector provides the widest range of 1,43, whereas the transportation sector 
noticeably has a much narrower spread than all other sectors. 





I advanced by making a histogram of all fixed effects. This is presented in Figure 12. Here one 
can see that the fixed effects are relatively concentrated between 1,92 and 2,4. There is however 
some left skew. This left skewness is mainly caused by the technological sector.  
Figure 12 - Fixed effects, histogram 
 
 
Following the analysis on levels, I proceeded by analysing the effect of changes in the model 
DD on the changes in the credit rating implied DD at the individual firm level. Here changes in 
credit rating implied DD is the dependent variable and changes in model DD is the independent 
variable. The results of this regression are found in Table 19. If the difference between the 
model and the credit rating implied DD were just a question of levels, one should have a 
coefficient of 1. Instead, the regression results in a small negative intercept and a 𝛽 of only 0,04 
(Table 19). The intercept is significant at a 5% significance level, whereas 𝛽 is significant at all 
significance levels. Furthermore I attain an R-squared of 0,05, which tells us that the changes 
in the model DD is able to explain only 5% of the variance in the changes in the credit rating 
implied DD. I proceeded by running the same regression, but now not allowing for an intercept. 
Notice that since the model is written in differences, an intercept implies a trend in the DD. The 
results of this regression are also found in Table 19, where it is apparent that the 𝛽 and R-
squared almost do not change.  
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Table 19 - Panel regression, changes 
 
 
Both regressions in Table 19 provided very small 𝛽-values and an R-Squared slightly lower 
than expected. One possible explanation for this finding is the high persistence in credit ratings. 
In order to explore this hypotehsis I estimated the amount of periods where there is no change 
in credit ratings at the individual company level. The aggregated results of this can be seen in 
Table 20.  
Table 20 - Credit rating, periodical changes 
 
 
It can be noted that 74% of the time there are no changes in credit ratings (Table 20). 
Consequently the small size of 𝛽 may be due to the fact that ratings do not change, which turns 
estimation particularly hard with a linear model.  
In order to adress this issue, a dummy variable was added to the regression of the effect of 
changes in the model DD on the changes in the credit rating implied DD at the individual firm 
level. This dummy variable took the value one when there were no changes in credit rating, and 
zero otherwise. In addition, I added an interaction term between the dummy variable and the 
model DD. The results of this regression can be found in Table 21.  
From Table 21 one can see that I obtain a small estimate for the dummy variable, which is not 
deemed significant. However, a clearly negative and significant cross term Dummy:Beta was 
found. This result is in line with the expectations. In addition, the model 𝛽 increased from 
0,04(Table 19) to 0,15 (significant at all levels). Despite a clear increase, this is still a small 
figure. The R-Squared also increased significantly from 0,05 (Table 19) to 0,17. Hence, the 
inclusion of the dummy variable clearly provides to regression with greater explanatory power. 
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From all this it can be concluded that changes in the model DD and changes in the credit rating 
implied DD clearly covary. However, the changes in model DD have a significantly larger 
variation leading the 𝛽 to be statistically different from one.  
Table 21 - Panel regression, changes with dummy variable 
 
7. Conclusion 
The main objective of this dissertation was to study whether the bankruptcy measures estimated 
by the standard EBIT-based structural model presented in section 3 of Goldstein, Ju and Leland 
(Goldstein, Ju, & Leland, 2001) are comparable to those produced by credit rating agencies. 
The scope of study was all non-financial companies present on the S&P500 throughout the 
2004-2018 period. 
 
Model and credit rating implied credit risk measures were found to be different, but broadly 
comparable. On average the probability of default coming from the structural model 
underestimated credit implied values by 0,68 p.p. Whereas, distance to default coming from the 
structural model was found to overestimate credit implied values by only 0,57 standard 
deviations. This underprediction of credit risk was prominent across all sectors. However, the 
degree of underprediction was found to be varying vastly. The clear underprediction of credit 
risk was found in all years of the study, except from the financial crisis period, where the 
probability of default coming from the structural model overestimated credit implied values by 
0,14 p.p. This dissertation also discussed possible reasons for this underestimation, notably the 
lack of jumps and debt rollover. 
 
Following the analysis of averages, the dissertation proceeded to analyse the relation between 
the model and credit rating probabilities of default and distance to default. Both credit risk 
measures were found to show a relatively strong correlation. The probability of default had a 
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correlation between the two approaches of 44%, whereas the distance to default obtained a 
clearly higher correlation of 52%. The particular relation between the model and credit rating  
distance to default was studied further through econometric analysis.  
 
The econometric analysis was done through multiple panel data regressions. These consisted 
of regressions on levels with and without firm fixed effects and on time differences. The 
average firm fixed effects was found to be similar across sectors. All regressions found the 
model distance to default measure to be significant at all usual confidence levels. However, the 
coefficient associated with the measure was found to be small for all approaches. This suggests 
that the structural model tends to overreact on all new information, while the credit rating 
agencies act more smoothly.   
 
Nevertheless, there are a few limitations that have to be mentioned regarding this dissertation.  
The EBIT-based model (Goldstein, Ju, & Leland) does not allow for companies with negative 
EBIT. This results in the model not being able to asses many companies in the developing 
stages and other companies operating on a negative EBIT. The assumption of a Geometric 
Brownian motion does not allow for jumps, which is prominent in real life. Additionally, debt 
is considered to be perpetual, which is not always the case in real life.  
 
In addition to limitations stemming from the model, there are also limitations as a result of the 
methods used in model calibration. During construction of the model I assumed constant tax 
rates across all periods, if this had been varying through time, results may have changed. I 
removed outliers when estimating equity volatility in order to make it comparable to previous 
studies. Using non altered values may have altered estimates slightly. Several of the variables 
have been constructed through interpolation. Different approaches were possible, which could 
lead to different results. Lastly, the removal of companies with negative EBIT on average 
and/or no interest costs may result in a skewed representation of both individual sectors and the 
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9. Appendix  
Appendix 1 - Company overview pt.1 
 
 




Appendix 3 - Shapiro-Wilks pt.1 
 
Appendix 4 - Shapiro-Wilks pt.2 
 










9 Data from S&P's 2018 annual corporate default study and rating transition report. 
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Appendix 7 - Numerical scheme10 
 
 
Appendix 8 - Damodaran equity risk premium 
 
 
10 Source: Sajjad, Faiza. (2018). Credit Rating as a Mechanism for Capital Structure Optimization: Empirical 




Appendix 9 - Model implied equity volatility 
Model implied equity volatility 
The model implied equity volatility is found through the application of Ito’s lemma  
 
 






















In Figure 13 one can see that in times of crisis when the value of assets is closer to the barrier 
of default 𝜎𝑒,𝑖𝑡𝑜  is high. Whereas in calmer times, 𝜎𝑒,𝑖𝑡𝑜  is lower.  
 
Even though the equity volatility varies across time, the average value should be very close to 
the one calculated based on log changes in equity. This comparison is shown in Figure 14. 
Figure 14 - Empirical equity volatility vs. model implied equity volatility 
 
As expected, the average equity volatility found through the application of Ito’s lemma is able 
to explain close to all variation in the empirical equity volatility.   
 
Appendix 10 - Return on assets 
Return on assets - 𝝁𝒂 
The return on assets is estimated as the risk-free rate plus the product of 𝜃 and 𝜎𝑎. Since the 
risk-free rate is the same for all companies, the difference between the sectors is driven by 𝜃 












As the average asset volatility of the 9 sectors are close in promilitary to each other, the 
difference in levels are mainly cause by 𝜃.  
 
The average 𝜇𝑎 across the time series can be found in Table 22 
Table 22 - Average return on assets 
 
 
Here one sees that the technology sector has a significantly higher average 𝜇𝑎 than the other 
sectors, whereas the utilities- and communication services sector has a markedly lower value. 
These results were expected in both the technology- and utilities sector.  
 
All of these results are significantly lower than the return on equity, as the asset volatility is 
much lower than the empirical equity volatility. This issue is further analysed in Appendix 11. 
 
 
Appendix 11 - Return on equity 
Return on equity - 𝝁𝒆 
The return on equity is computed according to Eq. (29), which simplifies to the expected 
return on equity in accordance to the capital asset pricing model. Here return on equity is the 
risk-free rate plus the product of 𝛽 and EQRP. When computing 𝜇𝑒  it is important to 
remember that both risk-free rate and EQRP is a time series, whereas 𝛽 is constant. 
Consequently, variations in 𝜇𝑒 is cause either by changes in the EQRP or the risk-free rate.  
 
The evolution of 𝜇𝑒 for all sector can be seen in Figure 16(panel A and B). In Figure 16(panel 














Due to the constant 𝛽 and a quite stable interest rate, all of the time series are dominated by 
the dynamics of the EQRP. As one can see the return on equity peaks at the end of 2008 
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during the financial crisis, in 2011 during the sovereign debt crisis in the EU and in 2014 
during the oil crisis.  
The average  𝜇𝑒  in the different sectors is found in Table 23. 
Table 23 - Average return on equity 
 
 
Since all sectors considered has the same EQRP and is subject to the same risk-free rate, the 
variations are cause singlehandedly by differences in 𝛽. As the technology sector is subject to 
more systematic risk, its return on equity is higher. Whereas the utilities sector due to its 
small 𝛽 has a drastically lower return on equity.  
 
Appendix 12 - Code 
#GJL model functions 
 
x_function <-function(rf, k, sig_a) { 
  miu <- rf-k  
  a <- sig_a^2/2 
  b <- 2*rf*sig_a^2 
  c <- (miu-a)^2 
  d <- miu-a 
  e <- d+sqrt(c+b) 
  x <- e/sig_a^2  
  return(x) 
} 
y_function <- function(rf, k, sig_a) { 
  miu <- rf-k 
  a <- sig_a^2/2 
  b <- 2*rf*sig_a^2 
  c <- (miu-a)^2 
  d <- miu-a 
  e <- d-sqrt(c+b) 
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  y <- e/sig_a^2  
  return (y) 
} 
#Default Barrier Function  
#found by invoking smooth pasting condition 
v_b_function <- function( rf, k, sig_a, C) { 
  l_d <- x_function(rf=rf, k=k, sig_a=sig_a) / (x_function(rf=rf, k=k, sig_a=sig_a)+1) 
  V_b <- l_d*C*(1/rf) 




p_b_function <- function( v_a, rf, k, sig_a, C){ 
  R<- v_a/v_b_function(rf=rf, k=k, sig_a=sig_a, C=C) 
  p_b <- R^(-1*x_function(rf=rf, k=k, sig_a=sig_a)) 
  return ((R>1)*p_b+(R<=1)*10^10) 




v_int_function <- function( v_a, rf, k, sig_a, C ){ 
  v_int <- (1-p_b_function( v_a=v_a, rf=rf, k=k, sig_a=sig_a, C=C ))*C/rf  
  return(v_int) 
} 
 
v_solv_function <- function(v_a, rf, k, sig_a, C){ 
  v_solv <- v_a - v_b_function( rf=rf, k=k, sig_a=sig_a, C=C )*p_b_function( v_a=v_a, rf=rf, 
k=k, sig_a=sig_a, C=C)  
  return(v_solv) 
} 
 
e_function <- function( v_a, rf, k, sig_a, C, TaxCorp, TaxDiv){ 
  Tx_eff <- (1-TaxCorp)*(1-TaxDiv) 
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  return(Tx_eff*(v_solv_function( v_a=v_a, rf=rf, k=k, sig_a=sig_a, C=C)-v_int_function ( 











Time   <- xpto[,0]        
date    <- as.numeric(xpto[,1]) 
EBIT     <- as.numeric(xpto[,2]) 
Equity  <- as.numeric(xpto[,3]) 
Intexp     <- as.numeric(xpto[,4]) 
RF      <- as.numeric(xpto[,5])*0.01 
rf      <- as.numeric(xpto[,5])*0.01 
 
FindV <- function(x, k, sig_a, TimeM) { 
  ModelEquity<-e_function(v_a=x, rf=RF[TimeM], k=k, sig_a, C=Intexp[TimeM], 
TaxCorp=0.2, TaxDiv=0.2) 
  #print(ModelEquity) 
  return(Equity[TimeM]-(ModelEquity>0 & ModelEquity<x)*ModelEquity) 
} 
 
#Finds the project value that matches equity value 










FindAssetVol <- function (k, Start_sig_a) { 
  Error <- 10^10 
  while (Error > 0.00001){ 
    RecoveryAssetVec_1 <- Vfunction(k, sig_a=Start_sig_a) 
    log_ret <- diff(log(RecoveryAssetVec_1),lag=1) 
    sig_a1 <-  sd(log_ret)*sqrt(52)  
    Error<- abs(Start_sig_a-sig_a1)  
    Start_sig_a <- sig_a1 
  } 
  return(sig_a1) 
} 
 
# K as average of  (EBIT)/AssetVector  
Findk<- function(Start_k, sig_a){ 
  Error <- 10^10 
  for (i in 1:783) 
    while (Error>0.00001){ 
      RecoveryAssetVec_1 <- Vfunction(k=Start_k, sig_a) 
      k_a1 <- (sum(EBIT[1:783]))/sum(RecoveryAssetVec_1) 
      Error<- abs(Start_k-k_a1)  
      Start_k <- k_a1 
    } 
  return(k_a1) 
  return(RecoveryAssetVec_1) 
} 
 
FindEstimates<- function(Start_k, Start_sig){ 
  Error <- 10^10       
  for (i in 1:783) 
    while (Error>0.00001){ 
      sig_a1 <-FindAssetVol(k= Start_k , Start_sig_a= Start_sig )          
      RecoveryAssetVec_1 <- Vfunction(k= Start_k,sig_a= Start_sig )    
 70 
 
      k_a1 <- (sum(EBIT[1:783]))/sum(RecoveryAssetVec_1)     
      Error<- abs(Start_k-k_a1)      
      Start_k <- k_a1    
    } 
  return(sig_a1)  
   
}  
 
FindEstimates2<- function(Start_k, Start_sig){ 
  Error <- 10^10       
  for (i in 1:783) 
    while (Error>0.00001){ 
      sig_a1 <-FindAssetVol(k= Start_k , Start_sig_a= Start_sig )          
      RecoveryAssetVec_1 <- Vfunction(k= Start_k,sig_a= Start_sig )    
      k_a1 <- (sum(EBIT[1:783]))/sum(RecoveryAssetVec_1)    #changed formula do find 
delta/assets aka k 
      Error<- abs(Start_k-k_a1)      
      Start_k <- k_a1    
    } 
  return(k_a1)  
}  
 
#run the iterative approach at once and safe the values in sig_a & k 
Sig_K <-FindEstimates(Start_k=0.05,Start_sig=0.2) 
sig_a <- Sig_K[1] 
 
Sig_K1 <-FindEstimates2(Start_k=0.05,Start_sig=0.2) 
k    <- Sig_K1[1]  
 
# Define Market price risk 
EQRP <- as.numeric(xpto[,6]) #in percentage 







#cleaned empirical achieved standard deviation of Equity 
#cleaning the data from outliers 
#empirically computing the equity standard deviation 
sig_e1      <- sd(diff(log(Equity[1:783]))) 
all_outliers<- diff(log(Equity[1:783])) 
limits <- 3*sig_e1 
all_outliers<- all_outliers[!(all_outliers> limits)] 
all_outliers<- all_outliers[!(all_outliers< -limits)] 
b           <- boxplot(all_outliers) 




Mk_Rsk <- function(EQRP,beta,sig_e1){ 
  Mk_Rsk    <- (beta*EQRP)/sig_e1 
  return(Mk_Rsk) 
} 




# Sigma as standard deviation of log returns  
Findmiu_a <- function(beta, EQRP, sig_a,Mk_Rsk){ 
  miu_a     <- RF+Mk_Rsk*sig_a 
  return(miu_a) 
} 




#Find miu_d => drift of the project/process 
miu_d_function <- function(beta,EQRP,sig_e1,sig_a,k,Mk_Rsk){ 
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  miu_d     <- RF+Mk_Rsk*sig_a-k 
  return(miu_d) 
} 
miu_d <- miu_d_function(beta, EQRP, sig_e1,sig_a,k,Mk_Rsk) 




#Probability of default function  
##scope of bankruptcy is DELTA_T 
 
RecoveryAssetVec_1 <- Vfunction(k,sig_a) 
Barrier<- 1:783 
for(i in 1:783){  
  Barrier[i]<-v_b_function(rf=RF[i], k, sig_a, C=Intexp[i]) 
} 
V_b_Ratio <- Barrier / RecoveryAssetVec_1      #Barrier => v_b_function => optimal level 
of default //// Recoveryassetvector => Asset value at time T 
max(Barrier/RecoveryAssetVec_1) 
 
# Time Series of PDs  
#Gives distance to distress (DD) at each moment in time 
# DD = how many standard deviations away from default 
DD<-function(k, sig_a, miu_a, years, Time){ 
  Delta_t <- 1/52 
  TimeT   <- 52*years  
  a <- (miu_a - k - (sig_a^2/2)) 
  b <- TimeT*Delta_t 
  c <- log(RecoveryAssetVec_1[Time]/v_b_function(rf=RF[Time], k=k, sig_a=sig_a, 
C=Intexp[Time])) 
  d <- sig_a*sqrt(b) 
  e<- (c+a*b)/d 
} 
#Gives Probability of V being below V_B at time T (ignores first passage time) 
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AuxProbability<-function(k, sig_a, miu_a, years, Time){  
  pnorm(-DD(k, sig_a, miu_a, years, Time)) 
} 
#Gives the probability of defaulting in "years"-years at time "Time" 
PDfunc <- function(k, sig_a, miu_a, years, Time) 
{  
  Delta_t <- 1/52 
  TimeT   <- 52*years  
  a <- (miu_a - k - (sig_a^2/2)) 
  b <- TimeT*Delta_t 
  c <- log(v_b_function(rf=RF[Time], k=k, sig_a=sig_a, 
C=Intexp[Time])/RecoveryAssetVec_1[Time]) 
  d <- sig_a*sqrt(b) 
  e <- pnorm(((a*b)-c)/d) 
  f <- exp((2/sig_a^2)*a*c)*pnorm(((a*b)+c)/d) 
  g <- e-f 
  return(1-g) 
} 
 
PD_Series <- 1:783 
DD_Series <- 1:783 
PD_Series_aux1 <- 1:783 
 
#Computes output 
for(i in 1:783){ 
  DD_Series[i]<-DD(k, sig_a, miu_a=miu_a[i], years=5,Time=i) 
  PD_Series_aux1[i]<-AuxProbability(k, sig_a, miu_a[i], years=5,Time=i) 











#Creating all the necessary new functions in order to compute the timeseries of estimated 
equity volatilities. All functions below is like their previously defined functions, but now the 
derivative with respect to asset value. 
 
# The derivative of the probability of default with respect to asset value. 
p_b_deriv_function <- function( v_a, rf, k, sig_a, C){ 
  R<- v_a/v_b_function(rf=rf, k=k, sig_a=sig_a, C=C) 
  a<- x_function(rf=rf, k=k, sig_a=sig_a) 
  b<- (v_a*(R^(1*x_function(rf=rf, k=k, sig_a=sig_a)))) 
  c<- -(a/b) 
  return ((R>1)*c+(R<=1)*10^10) 
  return (c) 
} 
 
# The derivative of V_int with respect to asset value. 
v_int_deriv_function <- function( v_a, rf, k, sig_a, C ){ 
  v_int_deriv <- (p_b_deriv_function( v_a=v_a, rf=rf, k=k, sig_a=sig_a, C=C ))*C/rf  
  return(v_int_deriv) 
} 
 
# The derivative of V_solv default with respect to asset value. 
v_solv_deriv_function <- function(v_a, rf, k, sig_a, C){ 
  a<-(-p_b_deriv_function( v_a=v_a, rf=rf, k=k, sig_a=sig_a, C=C )) 
  b<- v_b_function(rf=rf, k=k, sig_a=sig_a, C=C) 
  v_solv_deriv<- (a*b)+1 
  return(v_solv_deriv) 
} 
 
# The derivative of equity with respect to asset value. 
e_deriv_function <- function( v_a, rf, k, sig_a, C, TaxCorp, TaxDiv){ 
  Tx_eff <- (1-TaxCorp)*(1-TaxDiv) 
 75 
 
  return(Tx_eff*(v_solv_deriv_function( v_a=v_a, rf=rf, k=k, sig_a=sig_a, C=C)-
v_int_deriv_function ( v_a=v_a, rf=rf, k=k, sig_a=sig_a, C=C ))) 
} 
 
# Computing the time series of equity volatility. As the product of the derivative of equity 
with respect to asset value, asset volatility and asset value over equity. 
 
Sigma_E<- 1:783 
for(i in 1:783){  
  Sigma_E[i]<- e_deriv_function(v_a=RecoveryAssetVec_1[i], rf=RF[i], k=k, sig_a, 
C=Intexp[i], TaxCorp=0.2, TaxDiv=0.2)*sig_a*(RecoveryAssetVec_1[i]/Equity[i]) 
} 
 
#Firm specific output. 
Output2<-do.call(rbind.data.frame,Map('c', PD_Series, DD_Series, V_b_Ratio, 
RecoveryAssetVec_1, sig_a, k, sig_e1, Sigma_E, miu_a. miu_d, miu_e,Mk_Rsk )) 
write.table(Output2, file = "UPS_specific Important.csv",  sep=";", dec = ",") 
 
#Sector output of core data for easier treatment.  
Output2<-do.call(rbind.data.frame,Map('c', CSXPD_Series, FDXPD_Series, NSCPD_Series, 
LUVPD_Series, UNPPD_Series, UPSPD_Series, CSXDD_Series, FDXDD_Series, 
NSCDD_Series, LUVDD_Series, UNPDD_Series, UPSDD_Series, CSX_V_b_Ratio, 
FDX_V_b_Ratio, NSC_V_b_Ratio, LUV_V_b_Ratio, UNP_V_b_Ratio, UPS_V_b_Ratio)) 
write.table(Output2, file = "600 Important.csv",  sep=";", dec = ",") 
 
 
 
 
 
 
